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Constitutional Fathers-Constitutional Sonst
Louis Henkin*
My title, obviously, borrows from Turgenev, suggesting
generational contrast if not conflict. Unwittingly, perhaps, I
may have also echoed Lawrence, for we are sons as well as
lovers of the Constitution.
In this ceremonial year the reference to our political ancestors stirs various questions. One might ask whether their hopes
have been realized; or whether, perhaps, the fears of the forgotten opponents of ratification have been justified. A different
sweep of questions might explore, how do we run a twentieth
century government on an eighteenth century blueprint? A
question which I would not begin to know how to address might
ask how we have avoided the fate of other countries-recurrent
revolutions, strong-man-monarchy or military oligarchy, successive or suspended constitutions, emergency repression, and government by decree?
Directly, I address questions of a narrower focus, but nonetheless overwhelming. Our ancestors translated political ideas
into revolution, constitution, and political institutions. What
have two hundred years done to their ideas, their revolution,
their constitution, and their institutions?
I.
This paper might be subtitled "Our Revolution-Constitution
200 Years Old." Hyphenating our revolution and our Constitution would bridge 13 years to justify celebrating in 1976 the anniversary of a constitution not born until 1789. It would not be
a distortion, however, for the chain between independence and
American constitutionalism is continuous, and the links are
strong and intimate; and the authentic birthdate of both was in
fact 1776.
That has not been universally understood. Many have noted
the differences in language and spirit between the Declaration
t This Article derives from the first of two lectures under this
title, delivered at the University of Minnesota Law School on April 2829, 1976, as the William B. Lockhart Lectures.
* Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy
and Professor of Law, Columbia University.
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of Independence and the United States Constitution.' Indeed,
it would be surprising if there were not such differences, for revolution and state-building are wholly different tasks, carried out
in wholly different moods, as a hundred revolutions have learned
in our time. A revolution defies authority, overthrows government, is above the law. The constitution that follows reimposes
authority, provides legitimacy and a blueprint for new government, restores law. Declarations of independence are the manifesto, the ideal, the reach; constitutions are the grasp, the effort
to realize revolutionary aims.
Also-as many other countries have learned more recentlyrevolutions do not solve all problems; at best, they create a new
context and other conditions for solving them. In the American
colonies, revolution had united diverse, antagonistic interests,
subordinating differences and postponing difficulties. With independence, divergencies came to the fore, pre-war differences
reemerged, but now we were no longer British subjects and
dependents, and the problems had become all our own. As John
Jay said: "It takes time to make sovereigns of subjects."2
Indeed, some problems had been aggravated by war and other
difficulties during the ten years following the Declaration. The
revolution itself unleashed radical forces: that victory and
independence did not bring the millennium fed fires of discontent. The Constitutional Fathers, I remind you, met in Philadelphia during the year of Shays' Rebellion. "You and I did not
imagine when the first war with Britain was over, that revolution was just begun."3
In fact, however, the Declaration of Independence and
American constitutionalism are of one piece, and belong together
in our national hagiography. The Declaration, invoking seventeenth century English philosophers against eighteenth century
English politicians, asserted the principles which were deemed
to justify self-government. (We would call it "self-determination" today). In doing that, the Declaration also implied and
promised that these principles, sanctioned "in reason, conscience
and piety,"'4 would be the principles on which the new government would be founded.

1. See

(1919).

C. BEARD, ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

2. Quoted in A. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 138 (1935).

3. Harrison Gray Otis, quoted in J. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERI(1943).
4. R. PERRY, PUTANISM AND DEmOCRACY 127 (1944).

CAN REVOLUTION 505
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This is indeed what happened; our rebellious ancestors
became a generation of constitution-makers. Though practical
men-pragmatists, not political theorists or thinkers-they were
the first, perhaps the only "elite" in history to create deliberately
a viable political society by reasoning, not on the basis of experience, but essentially according to a theoretical blueprint. The
blueprint they used, impressionistically, half unknowingly, was
that summarized in the Declaration of Independence.
I speak, you may have noted, of the intimate links between
the Declaration of Independence and American constitutionalism,
not between the Declaration and the United States Constitution.
You will not find the principles of the Declaration reflected fully
or clearly in the Constitution, because the Constitution was not
a direct descendant of the Declaration, nor, I dare to say, was it
at conception and birth an authentic, full-blown expression of
American constitutionalism.
Let me explain this heresy. It contributes to understanding
our national history and our politics as well as our law, to keep
in mind our constitutional genealogy. With independence the
thirteen colonies became thirteen states with state constitutions
and state governments. These constitutions and governments
were the direct descendants of the Declaration of Independence,
carrying out its political promises. The Virginia Declaration of
Rights antedated (by weeks) even the more famous Declaration
of Independence, and Thomas Jefferson clearly owed to George
Mason. The Virginia Declaration surely justifies a bicentennial
celebration of American constitutionalism in 1976, and it, and
John Adams's constitution for the state of Massachusetts (1780),
surely belong in a prominent place in the national testament.
The United States Constitution, 13 years younger, was not
only a "come-lately," but at best only a collateral heir of the
Declaration, deriving from a concurrent but parallel development. At the time that the colonies were moving to independence,
to self-government, they also moved to union: on the same
day in June 1776 that a committee was appointed to draft a
declaration of independence, another was appointed to draft
articles of union.5 The Articles of Confederation, being articles
of marriage, not of divorce, took longer to prepare, but they too
were born in 1776 (and were completed by 1777, although they
5.

ed.).

See 5 JouRNALS or THE CONTINENTAL CoqGR s

431, 433

(1906
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did not come into effect until 1781). As the proverbial school
boy knows, the Constitutional Fathers came to Philadelphia
authorized to improve the Articles of Confederation, but went
beyond their instructions, abandoned the Articles, and produced
in its stead the United States Constitution.
Conceptually, too, the United States Constitution descended
not from the Declaration and its principles of self-government,
but from the Articles and its quest for union. Although there
was some concern in 1787 about disorder in the states, and a
desire to preserve, perhaps reform, their "republicanism," the
focus in Philadelphia was on the needs and uses of union, not
on principles of government and the relation of individual to
society, to which the Declaration and the state constitutions had
spoken. Little of what had gone into the state constitutions from
the Declaration was touched at Philadelphia. The state conconstitutions and the state governments were not modified or
swallowed up by the new United States Constitution; only the
links between state governments were transformed, into a small
superstructure of government over the state governments, to deal
with the consequences and issues of union.
In sum, while the state constitutions descended from the
Declaration and its principles of self-government, the United
States Constitution descended from the Articles and its concerns
with union. The principles of American constitutionalism were
alive before confederation, and remained largely unaffected by
it. In principle, and probably in fact, constitutional government
would have been alive here had the states abandoned the effort
to confederate and gone 13 separate ways, had they become two
or three confederacies, or had confederation under the Articles
survived and succeeded, and the Constitution we know never
been born.
My brief genealogical excursion will explain why, unlike the
Declaration and the state constitutions, the United States Constitution articulates no political theory and contains little rhetoric.
Unlike self-government, union had no political theory. Nor did
union have much rhetoric, even in the dramatic days of 1776
when the Articles were being drafted. All the political theory
in the Constitution is that implied in the fact of a written
constitution, and in "We the people. . . ordain this Constitution."
All the rhetoric is in a few borrowed, undefined references to
"justice" and the "blessings of liberty." There was no bill of
rights, of course; individual rights were not implicated in the
issues of union that were the concern of the new superstructure
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of government. 6 Powers were allocated to different branches
of the new government more or less separate, but there is no
articulation and justification of the philosophy of the separation
of powers, as there is in the early Virginia and Massachusetts
constitutions. 7 Even federalism, which was of course original,
is not articulated or justified in principle, and owed less to Locke
and Montesquieu than to the small experience of our ancestors,
to their practical fears and needs, and to their political compromises, emerging as "the mosaic of their second choices." 8
As the price of ratification, we know, opponents exacted the
promise of a bill of rights, and one was added shortly after the
new government was formed. Even with the Bill of Rights, however, the United States Constitution lacked much of what we
identify with American constitutionalism and the promises of
the Declaration of Independence. It is in the early state constitutions that we find full expression of a theory of republican
government based on popular sovereignty, a social compact
expressed in a written constitution, natural unalienable rights, 9
limited government for limited purposes, free elections, universal
(if qualified) suffrage, accountability and recall of officials, principles of separation of powers, an independent judiciary, no
executive suspension of the laws. Early declarations of rights
suggest principles not even implied in the United States Constitution, even as amended by the Bill of Rights-the right to be
protected in life, liberty, and property (not merely that the government shall not deprive us of them); the right to justice
6. Toward the end of the Convention George Mason suggested
that a bill of rights be prepared, but the proposal was given short shrift
and unanimously rejected. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 at 587-88 (1911) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND].
7. See VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, June 12, 1776, § 5, reproduced in 7 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3812, 3813 (1909)
[hereinafter cited as 7 THORPE-VIRGINiA DECLARATION]; MASSACHUSETTS
CONSTITUTION OF 1780, pt. I, art. XXX, reproduced in 3 THORPE, supra
at 1893 [hereinafter cited as 3 THORPE--MASSACHUSETTs DECLARATION];

text accompanying note 26 infra.
8. The phrase is adapted from the Beards. See C.A. & M.R. BEARD,
THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 317 (Rev. ed. 1935).
9. The principle of antecedent autonomy and retained rights is reflected in the ninth amendment to the United States Constitution: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." (Emphasis supplied.) And in the tenth amendment: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." (Emphasis supplied.)
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and to a judicial remedy; the principle and the aspiration of
equality. 10
Seeing the United States Constitution as originally only a
secondary part of American constitutionalism is not to depreciate
the achievement of the framers. They made a nation. They
established the central government that governs us to this day,
virtually unchanged in conception and in detail. It is their Constitution which has become the principal American constitution,
subsuming and overwhelming state constitutions; it is their
Constitution which is now heir to the promises of the Declaration, which is our rod and our staff, and our glory to the world,
while the Declaration is largely reserved for children or relegated
to ceremonial occasions, and state constitutions hardly seem to
exist or to matter.
What I have called the genealogy of the Constitution has had
profound import during our constitutional history and still
shapes our lives today. It explains why the Bill of Rights, then
not applicable to the states" and not importantly implicated
in federal activities, seemed hardly to matter during our first
century (and beyond). 12 Although federal power grew, thanks
to nationalizing influences in American life legitimized by nationalistic interpretations of the Constitution, it took the Civil War
and the constitutional amendments that constituted the peace
treaty ending it to transform the relation of federal to state
governments and establish the United States Government and
the United States Constitution as we know them today.' 3 (We
do not celebrate our Revolution-Constitution of 1868, or revere
its framers.)
Because the United States Constitution achieved preeminence only halfway through our history, and because the
nationalizing amendments were addressed only to the states, it

10. See, e.g., 3 THORPE-MAsSACHUsETTS DECLARATION, supra note 7,
pt. I, arts. I, X, XI at 1889, 1891.
Virginia enjoined firm adherence and frequent recurrence to principles of "justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, virtue"; Massachusetts omitted "virtue" but added "piety and industry." Compare
7 THORPE--VRG NIA DEcLARATION, supra note 7, § 15 at 3814 with
3 THORPE--MASSACHUSETTS DECLARATION, supra note 7, pt. I, art. 18 at
1892. Was there a difference between Virginia and Massachusetts?
between George Mason and John Adams?

11.

Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).

Or

But compare

text accompanying notes 93-94 infra.
12. The only time it was invoked by the Supreme Court before the

Civil War was to vindicate the property rights of Dred Scott's master.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

13.

See text accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
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has continued to this day to suffer its genetic defects. The Constitution still suffers the lack of a political theory; it rests on
a less-than-complete foundation of popular sovereignty, social
compact, limited accountable government; it wants a full panoply
of unalienable rights and a coherent theory of separation of
powers or federalism. 14 Doctrines homogenizing American
constitutionalism, or creating new rights (e.g., indefeasible citizenship, political equality, essential individual autonomy as
regards "private matters")' 5 had to be spun very slowly and
late by questionable and controversial interpretations. We still
do not have an authentic constitutional base for demanding equal
protection of the laws of the federal government, having to
intone "due process of law," the same clause that Taney invoked
to maintain Dred Scott's slavery.' 6
I stress: whatever the genealogy, however long it took,
American constitutionalism brought the kind of government
implied and promised in the Declaration of Independence. One
should quickly add that many saw, and see, in the Declarationin "all men are created equal" and the unalienable rights "to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"-other implications
and promises. There was, there is, disagreement as to what these
promised. Though our revolutionary fathers were radical as
regards Great Britain, they were conservative at home-Washington, Mason, even Henry and Jefferson. For some, surely, 1776
was to be " a 'safe and sane' revolution of gentlemen, by gentlemen and for gentlemen."'17 That "all men are created equal,"
it has been urged, supported popular sovereignty and social
compact, justifying independence and self-government, but said
nothing about economic and social equality. For others, however, equality and the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness at least outlawed slavery and promised opportunity for all
equally. Those promises neither state nor federal constitutional
fathers fulfilled; some of them finally came alive after the Civil
8
War; some, many believe, we have not fulfilled yet.'
14. Periodically, the Supreme Court invokes separation of powers,
but less on some coherent theory than on a literal reading of particular
clauses, as, say, in the Election Campaign Act case of 1976. See notes 48
& 99 infra and accompanying text.
15. Cf. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); see notes 56, 76, & 91
infra and accompanying text.
16. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
See also note 12 supra and accompanying text.
17. MILLER, supra note 3, at 498.
18. See text accompanying note 119 infra.
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II

The Constitutional Fathers created a Government of the
United States in the stead of a league of states, a federal government joined with the pre-existing state governments in a unique
federal system. In that federalism-states and union togetherthe people were sovereign; government was defined by written
constitutions and had limited powers; the powers given to
government were separated and fractionized; unalienable natural
rights and liberties were preserved and protected. These words
are familiar to us. What did they mean to our ancestors? What
do they mean to us?
Consider first the Constitution. Our fathers saw a constitution as a contract by the people with each other, to form a
government and accept its authority, to define its purposes and
powers, to blueprint its structure and procedures. It was, as
well, a contract between the people and their government, prescribing what government should, might, or might not do, and
how it should, might, or might not do it. Since it was their
constitution, the people could, of course, abandon, replace, or
alter it at their will.
Consider also "popular sovereignty." For the fathers of
American constitutions "the people," though undefined, was a
reality, a political entity that could act. The sovereignty of the
people meant that government had to be justified in an actual
social compact creating government. It meant, in principle, a
perpetual right for the people to do it differently, a perpetual
right to revolt, to ordain a new constitution and change the government or the system of government. The people-by majority,
an unexamined axiom, male, of course, and qualified ("having
sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and
attachment to the community"' 9 ) -govern through representatives, their magistrates, their chosen betters. For the government of the United States most of that magistracy was chosen
indirectly. Only the House of Representatives was directly
elected by the people, by those qualified to vote for the most
numerous branch of the state legislature. 20 Senators were to
be chosen by state legislatures, 21 the President by special electors;22 officials were to be appointed, principally (I simplify)
19.
20.
21.
22.

7 THoRPF-VIRGINIA DECLARATION, supra note 7, § 6, at 3813.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2; art. II, §§ 1, 2.
Id. at art. I, § 3.
Id. at art. II, § 1.
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by the President.
Next consider limited government. For our ancestors
goveinment was limited inherently, axiomatically, by its foundations in a social compact, in the will of its creator, the people.
It was limited also by the original autonomy of the individual,
reflected in natural rights-unalienable and retained when government is created. But government was limited also in conception, in that it was created for particular limited purposes. For
"the people" feared government and did not wish or ask much
of it. Government was essentially a watchdog; and, we have all
heard, "that government governs best which governs least."
Thomas Jefferson, not strictly a father of the United States
Constitution, but surely a father of American constitutionalism,
was not idiosyncratic. Recall his first inaugural address:
Still one thing more, fellow-citizens-a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another,
shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of
industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth
of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government,
and this is necessary to close the circle of our felic24
ities.
Limited government was to be assured, and the dangers of
tyranny minimized, by fractionizing governmental power. Unlike the state constitutions, of course, the United States Constitution has its particular form of fractionization in the vertical
separation between federal and state authority, preventing dangerous concentrations of power as well as prescribing a preference and presumption for local government. The federal government was limited in that its powers were only those delegated
and enumerated, while the rest were reserved to the states.
State government was limited by exclusion from foreign affairs
and other concerns of union, and by the supremacy of the United
States Constitution, laws, treaties, and government in their delegated domain. Of course, in principle and in general, the United
States Constitution did not impose on the states limitations not
25
required by considerations of union.
23. Id. at § 2.
24. J. RICHARDSON, A CoMPILATIoN OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS 323 (1896).
25. The Bill of Rights, soon adopted, did not, of course, apply to
the states.

See note 11 supra and accompanying text.

The relevance

to union of some of the limitations on the states in the original Constitution-for example, those which forbid bills of attainder or ex post facto
laws-is not obvious and the reasons for their inclusion are not agreed
upon.
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The principal fractionization of power, in the United States
as in state constitutions, was the separation of powers. Separation was an article of faith, the final article of John Adams's
Declaration, giving it striking emphasis:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial
powers, or either of them: the executive shall never exercise
the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powbe a government of
ers, or either of them:
26 to the end it may
laws and not of men.

The Constitution says nothing of the separation of powers,
but whether what it provides be called separated or "mixed,"
the principle is reflected in its designations and allocations of
authority. The purpose, as Justice Brandeis later put it, was to
build in inefficiency to prevent tyranny.2 7 That was the result,
and in part the purpose, of a bicameral legislature; of legislative
supremacy, yet with an independent executive; of civilian supremacy over the military; of a blend of other balances and
checks (Presidential veto, Senate consent) in a system unique
at the time and in history. In addition to being separate,
the judiciary was to be independent, 28 and to some unknown
and uncertain extent the courts were 29to monitor some or all of
the various limitations on government.
Consider finally that popular sovereignty and limited government implied retained rights, and that some natural rights
26. 3 THORPE-MASSACHUSETTS DECLARATION, supra note 7, pt. I,
art. XXX at 1893.
27. The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid
friction, but by means of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 46-47 (Madison). Cf. Madison: "[I~f
there is a principle in our constitution, indeed in any free Constitution,
more sacred than another, it is that which separates the legislative, executive, and judicial powers." 1 ANNALS OF CONGREsS-GALES' AND SEESee also id. at
TON'S HISTORY OF THE DEBATES IN CONGRESS 604 (1789).
516-17.
28. Compare 7 THORPE--VIRGINIA DECLARATION, supra note 7, § 5 at
2813 with 3 THORPE-MASSAcHUSETTS DECLARATION, supra note 7, pt. I,
arts. XXIX-XXX at 1893.
29. As to whether the Fathers contemplated judicial review, compare L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958), with Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principlesof Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959), and R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME COURT (1969).
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were unalienable. 30 The principal unalienable right of the
people was the right of self-government, including the right to
determine and to change that government. The form of government they selected, reflecting representative republicanism, was
also a fundamental right, and fragmented government was necessary to assure that the people would effectively maintain their
sovereignty, their representative government, as well as other,
particular, retained and unalienable rights. We have only fragmentary evidence of what these were-what were the purposes
of government to which they sacrificed some autonomy and
rights, and which were the rights they retained because they did
not need to, or wish to, or could not, alienate them. We know
that the rights they retained included freedoms we find in the
bills of rights (of the United States as well as of the states),
notably the political freedoms (speech, press, assembly); freedom
from established religion and the freedom to exercise religion;
the right to bear arms; some privacy from quartering troops and
from unreasonable and unwarranted searches and seizures; and
the protection of a fair public trial by a local jury. The Fathers
were concerned to maintain the security of property, so that it
might be taken only by due process of law, only for public use,
and only with just compensation. 31
I stress one ancestral testament of near-constitutional
dimension commonly forgotten. Although the Constitutional
Convention rejected an express provision to that effect, Madison's view supporting admission of new states on the basis of
equality soon prevailed in fact.32 I stand today not in the
colony, or dominion, or even territory of Minnesota, speaking to
"natives," but in the state of Minnesota, addressing equal citizens.
These, in a word, were their principal constitutional, i.e.,
political, ideas. Needless to say, these were the prevailing,
"general average"; the Constitutional Fathers, and the rest of
30. See Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 75 COLum. L. REV. 1410,

1413 n.7 (1974).
31.

See text accompanying notes 54-55 infra.

32. See 2 FARAND, supra note 6, at 454; Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S.
559, 567 (1911); Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 689 (1882); Per-

moli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845). In ceding
the Northwest Territory to the United States, Virginia and Georgia insisted that in time its inhabitants should be equal citizens in equal states.
See Virginia Act of Cession-1783, reproduced in 2 THORPE, FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 955-56 (1911); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 212, 221 (1845). See also The Northwest Territorial Government, July 13, 1787, art. 5, reproduced in 2 THORPE, supra at 957, 962

[hereinafter cited as 2 THORPE-NORTHWEST

ORDINANCE].
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the generation of "the people" that ordained the constitutions,
were hardly unanimous. They had important differences and
ambivalences and made deep compromises. Some who were for
less government in 1776 doubtless wished for more in 1787, to
stay drift and disorder (e.g., Shays' Rebellion). Our ancestors
were torn between stability and change, between populism and
aristocracy, between union and local autonomy. They were not
agreed as to how "people's republicanism" should be reflected,
for they were divided between virtual and actual representation;
between one chamber and two, representing people or states;
between strong legislature and strong executive. All feared
tyranny but some feared also the tyranny of majorities, less perhaps from concern about majority passions or prejudices against
the deviant or idiosyncratic than from fear of "populism," egalitarianism, "levelism."
It may help grasp what has become of ancestral ideas if I
stop to underscore what they did not encompass or imply. For
them popular sovereignty did not mean democracy. The Fathers
of 1776, as of 1787, were republicans, not democrats. Voting
qualifications were left to the states and in no state was suffrage universal; in most it did not mean even all males, not even
all free males, not even all free white males.
The Constitution of the United States, and the early constitutions of the early states, did not guarantee essential liberty; the
United States Constitution even guaranteed further importation
of slaves for twenty years. Our ancestors did not provide for
equality, so prominent in the political theory and rhetoric of the
Declaration of Independence and of the early state constitutions.
The states did not consider that their rhetorical commitment to
equality automatically outlawed slavery, and the equal protection of equal laws was not guaranteed even to all free men, or
freeholders. The word "equal" is not in the United States Con33
stitution or in the United States Bill of Rights.
Looking around the world today, we might well be more
pleased with a different ancestral "omission," a happy fruit of
their political ideas. In a constitution ordained by the sovereign
33. Even the measure of equality implied in the fact that basic
rights are enjoyed by all "persons" did not reach slaves. See U.S. CoNST.
art. I, § 9; cf. id. at art. V. But the Northwest Ordinance, adopted by
the nearly moribund continental congress during that same summer of
1787 that found the framers in Philadelphia, legislated against the extension of slavery to the new territories. See 2 THORP--NORTHWEST ORDIxNANcE, supra note 32.
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people, constituting its social compact and its instructions to its
official trustees and servants, there is no provision for suspending
the Constitution or even the laws; no provision for government
other than by the people's representatives, for government by
decree. There is no provision for suspending any rights. Only
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (not the writ itself)
can be suspended, 34 and only by the people's representatives in
Congress, in cases of rebellion or invasion, if the public safety
requires it. And, comparing some other contemporary constitutions, there is no mention of the people's duties: 35 the people
knew they had duties, to God, to each other, and to their posterity, but these were not appropriate for a constitution.
III
What has our Constitution, our constitutionalism, become?
The words we use are the same and the ideas are similar: popular sovereignty, a written constitution, limited government,
individual rights, the federal system, separated powers.3, In the
34. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. That the writ is not suspended,
only the privilege of the writ, see Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2, 130-31 (1866). The difference is that the writ will issue and on its
return the issuing court can pass on the constitutionality and applicability of the suspension.
35. For some of the many examples of duties imposed upon individuals in constitutions, see CONSITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
art. V (1972); CONSTITUTION OF THE PmLiPPiNEs art. V (1972); ConSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ch. 10, art. 13033 (1936). See also UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 29

(1948).

36. Our ancestors perhaps taught us not to proclaim change and to
mask it under old labels. We were "the united states" from 1776, a
plural common noun with a perhaps exaggerating adjective, but an appropriate name for a confederation (cf. "The United Nations"); we have
become "the United States," a singular, composite proper noun, a less
apt name for a nation-state. Since nouns were capitalized, but capitalization was erratic, when that change occurred is not clear. (One can
not tell whether the Constitution treats "the United States" as a singular
or plural noun.)
The change from articles of a confederation of states to a constitution
creating a government was also muffled. The articles were also seen
as a "constitution" and as providing "government." See the resolution
of the continental congress convening the constitutional convention, 3
FARRAND, supra note 6, at 13-14. In the Constitution "the government
of the United States" is to be found only once (buried in the "necessary
and proper" clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18) and even there was perhaps used to describe the function (the governance) rather than an entity. As to our different conception of the Constitution, see text accompanying note 37 infra.
Under the Articles, decisions were taken by "the united states in congress assembled," and "the congress" was a gathering of state delega-
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federal government, and largely in the states, we have the same
institutions of government-legislative, executive, judicial-in
the unique configuration created by our ancestors. But all ideas
and institutions are somewhat different, and some have been
transformed.
For our ancestors, making the Constitution was a political
act, and the Constitution was a political document serving contemporary political purposes. 37 We do not see our Constitution
as a contemporary compact among us, "the people" of today, or
between us, the people, and our government today. Nor do we
see its provisions as reflecting the sovereignty, the will, the
wishes and ideas of people who lived 200 years ago, its authority
long expired and its substance out of date. For us the age of
the Constitution and its origins hallow rather than vitiate its
authority. For us the Constitution is law, the highest law, binding on the people as well as on the branches of government, and
resisting change, to be modified only by slow and difficult
processes.
For our ancestors, self-government and the forms of republican government were the principal individual rights, and frequently proclaimed as such. We, even our political leaders, are
not much given now to political theory or philosophic discourse;
tions, not a branch of government. "The Congress" is retained in the
Constitution; now "Congress" is the name of the legislative branch of
government and it is an affectation to use the article. For long "Congress" was not commonly capitalized.
The continental congress was presided over by a president. The
Constitution also provides for a "President" although he does not preside
over the Congress, or over anything at all. "Executive" is apt to describe
the President's responsibility to see that the laws of Congress are
faithfully executed, but hardly for other independent functions which
Hamilton said were implied, and which Presidents assumed, including
the control of foreign affairs. See Hamilton's Pacificus Letters, 7 WORKS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76, 81 (Hamilton ed. 1861); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 44-50 (1972).
"Federal'"-a word not in the Constitution, essentially meaning cre-

ated "by treaty," and smacking of a confederation-was claimed originally by those who preferred confederation (as under the Articles) and
opposed the Constitution, but they became the "anti-Federalists" when
the constitutionalists, nationalists, became "Federalists."
Might the reluctance to admit change and the tendency to mask it
under old labels have slowed change, and contributed to pragmatic, "experiential," gradual, incremental change?
37. Despite their commitment to self-government, the framers did
not hesitate to bind "the people" of the future. The right to amend the
Constitution apart, the only concession to the future was provision for
a census and for adjusting the number of representatives to changes in
population. But cf. text accompanying notes 109-110 infra.

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
perhaps we take it, and its embodiment in our system of government, for granted, letting it go without much saying. "The
people" is commonly referred to only in political rhetoric, and
while it remains perhaps a social conception, it is too massive
to be a political entity that could act or be activated. The social
compact is dismissed as myth or relegated to history. "Popular
sovereignty" is too unsophisticated for articulation in public discourse. In fact, it is now domesticated, tightly harnessed in
constitutional forms. To less than the whole people, surely, we
deny the right of revolution, even the right to write a new constitution; both would doubtless be rejected as "unconstitutional."
The Constitution can be amended, but only in accordance with
38
its terms, effectively only if the incumbent Congress agrees.
On the other hand, popular sovereignty has come to mean
to us democracy as well as republicanism. To our ancestors, as
to Plato, democracy was a dirty word; we have fought world
wars to defend it. For us popular sovereignty now means universal suffrage (virtually without qualifications) and equal vote,
and nearly direct election of our magistracy.3 9 The right to hold
office is also universal in principle, though the costs of seeking
office may have introduced an appalling property qualification.
Unlike our ancestors we seem to have the right to elect not only
our betters but our equals; indeed, we have been told that the
mediocre among us are also entitled to representation in kind.
Limited government remains our hallmark and is what we
think of when we think about our Constitution, but we have
abandoned a priori notions as to the limited purposes of government. 40 Unlike our ancestors we do not-consciously at leastpin our faith primarily on dispersing power through federalism
and separation, although separation, surely, is still a substantial
safeguard, as the case of Richard Nixon reminded us. Rather,
we rely on and resort to the Bill of Rights and other accrued
38. A few years ago many were frightened even at the thought that
a constitutional convention for a small particular purpose (for example
the Dirksen amendment) might be called, not by Congress, but by the
legislatures of the states, and some were prepared to treat it as "unconstitutional," although Article V of the Constitution expressly authorizes
it.
39. See U.S. CONsT. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. While the President is still
elected by electors (U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1), their autonomy is largely
hypothetical and they almost always vote as instructed by the voters.
Cf. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
40. See note 86 infra.
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individual safeguards, now limiting state and federal governments about equally, and monitored by the federal
judiciary
' 41
under the leadership of the "nine old infallibles."
We still have federalism, but we have moved far from
federation to nation, becoming-contrary to early conventional
wisdom-less "federalized" as our territory expanded. So much
of our lives is now regulated from the national center, so much
less is governed by local differences. Our federalism is no longer
defined by enumerated rights delegated to the federal government by the states, but rather by what is left to the states by
grace of the federal government. Today there is almost no subject
on which Congress might not legislate, and it has passed laws, e.g.,
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, deeply intrusive on state authority,
autonomy, and governmental integrity. 42 The courts and the
professors have been looking for limits on federal power but so
far with only small success. In the 40 years since the New Deal
revolution, only two acts of Congress have been held to be
beyond the powers delegated to Congress. In 1970, the Court
(by 5-4 vote) struck down a federal act granting the right to
vote to 18 year olds in state elections. 43 In 1976, the Court
(again by 5-4 vote) struck down congressional regulation of
wages and hours of state and municipal employees, as imposing
on "essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions," and devouring "the essentials of state sovereignty."44 In largest part we are a federal state politically
rather than constitutionally, 45 because of state and local influences in the extra-constitutional party system and in the processes
of electing the President and Congress. The other faces of federalism-the protection from state infringement of the federal
interest and the interests of other states-are also subject to congressional regulation and are monitored by' a federal judiciary.
41. "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible
only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953)
(Jackson. J., concurring).
42. The Supreme Court has usually upheld such laws. See, e.g.,
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)

(provisions of the

Voting Rights Act upheld as a valid exercise of congressional responsibility to enforce the Constitution).
43. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

44. National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976) (overru'ng Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)). The Court did not limit

the reach of the commerce power but held all federal power to be subject
to an essential state sovereign immunity implied in federalism.

45. States rights, something of a radical force during the years between independence and constitution, now bespeak conservatism, even
reaction.
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Separation of powers may never have been an accurate
description for our unique, mixed system, but, formally at least,
the mix prescribed by the framers still essentially pertains.
Indeed, whenever we begin to discount separation as a living
constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court comes along-at
about 25 year intervals-to confound us; in Myers (1926), upholding the President's power to remove an executive official
without the Senate consent which Congress had required; 46 in
Youngstown (1952), denying the President's power to seize the
steel mills when Congress apparently had other plans; 47 in
Buckley (1976), telling the Congress that only the President can
appoint the officials of the Federal Election Commission.48
Much of the change in our system of government reflects
the impact of extra-constitutional developments on the constitutional blueprint, modifying the nature and the shape of government. The rise of parties and the change from the ideology that
decried factions to one that sees two parties, publicly financed,
as essential to our democracy; the growth of population, the proliferation of states, of congressional membership and committees,
and of executive bureaucracy; the emergence of a Presidency
with an independent national constituency: these have transformed particular institutions, their relation to each other, and
the government they provide.
For our Fathers, Congress was first (Article I) -chief, and,
I think, also supreme and final; we tend to think and talk of
our system as beginning with the Presidency. That office, nonexistent under the Articles, born at Philadelphia of uncertain
size, grew and grew, until even small presidents are now imperial. We have come from the President as executor of the laws,
suggesting congressional agent and servant, to "The Chief Executive," with connotations of energy, power, independence, and
supremacy. The President is initiator, planner, master of the
budget and the legislative program, as well as maker of foreign
policy, foreign promises, and wars.
Congress too is different, of course. rn our federalism,
Congress has grown from enumerated to virtually unlimited
powers, from one volume of statutes during several years to a
46. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
47. Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
48. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley the Court
cited, as though it were alive and respectable, Springer v. Government
of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928). See note 99 infra and
accompanying text.
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swollen United States Code. But vis-a-vis the President, though
the principal constitutional power in domestic affairs is indisputably with Congress, Congress often appears reduced from
representative of the sovereign people, and its principal lawmaker, to competitor, frustrator, nibbler, harasser of the Presi49
dent-or his rubber stamp.
The federal courts have remained independent (even if
underpaid). With the growth of federal law the federal judiciary
has swelled in jurisdiction and in business, but its most dramatic
and interesting development, all know, has been from court of
law to constitutional arbiter. (Our ancestors apparently thought
of judicial review, but did not think about it much; we can only
guess what they had in mind, and people guess differently.5 ° )
In result, we think less about the judiciary as "the least dangerous branch," more about "judicial supremacy." 51 The courts
are separate, but more than equal. The Supreme Court is
supreme not only over the lower courts but over the political
institutions, federal as well as state; its right to read the Constitution has become almost exclusive; it is infallible because it is
52
final.
The role assumed by the courts may have effectively changed
the character of the Constitution. I have dared the heretical
question: have we the same conception of the Constitution our
Fathers had? Did they, perhaps, intend it to be selective rather
than complete; immediate rather than eternal; a suggestive guide
for reasonable men of politics in their time, rather than a tight
53
legal document to be parsed and litigated about for centuries?
Whatever the Fathers intended, the courts have given us "government by litigation," transforming the blueprint of government into a higher law, a common law in the hands of
judges, developed by common-law process and in common-law
54
tradition.
49. In one respect we have not served our ancestral principles well.
They gave us legislative supremacy over the executive and coupled it
with civilian, executive supremacy over the military. Now it appears
that the military is not effectively under civilian executive control because they have found too-good friends in Congress. Our ancestors
feared a standing army; we have a pretty big one and the largest defense
budget in history. They resisted taxation, while our defense program
has helped make us a most taxed people.
50. See note 29 supra.
51. See A. BICKEL, Tim LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); R. JACKSON,TIE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941).
52.
53.

See note 41 supra.
See text accompanying notes 109-110 infra.

54. Having made the Constitution into law, Marshall had to warn
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IV.
Perhaps the principal change in the Constitution we have
inherited is the character of our unalienable rights. Again, we
have largely kept the same words, but we have changed their
concept and content. The original Bill of Rights saw self-government as the principal right and other rights as supporting it and
deriving from the people's original political autonomy, retained
except as voluntarily delegated to government. The rights they
protected against governmental invasion were also essentially
political, designed to protect "the people" against tyranny. Freedom of speech was principally freedom of political speech;
freedom of the press would protect the press's role in the political process. Freedom of assembly was primarily a right of
political assembly, joined with the right to petition the government. Even freedom from establishment and freedom of religion
principally afforded protection for dissenters. The right to bear
arms served for protection against tyrants as well as external enemies. The home was to be private from political oppression by quartered troops and from unreasonable search and seizure. The people were not to be tyrannized by abuse of criminal
law and process. They were to be safe from ex post facto laws
and bills of attainder. They could not be arrested except upon
reasonable cause and subject to review on habeas corpus. They
were protected against improper accusation, conviction, and punishment-protected by grand jury indictment; by public speedy
trial, once; by the right to the assistance of counsel, to produce
witnesses and confront the government's witnesses; by freedom
from compulsion to testify, and from cruel and unusual punishment. They could be convicted of treason only subject to special
procedural safeguards, and could suffer only limited punishments. Life, liberty and property were all to be subject to the
law of the land and to due process of law; property could be
taken for public use only with just compensation, and by courts
only with the consent of a jury of peers. Men of property doubtless saw in these clauses protection for their property not only
against distant tyrants, but also against local, radical populism.
Some saw protections for their property also in the limitations
on state impairment of contracts and on the issuance of paper
money, and on discriminations against nonresidents.
us against being too legalist with it, in that now tired reminder: "it is
a constitution we are expounding." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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If I am correct in my understanding of them, our ancestors
protected largely political liberty; not-someone said-the rights
of man, but of gentlemen. Now we have moved beyond political
rights to civil rights and to personal rights. Being removed from
the social compact both in time and in our sense of our relations
to our government, we see our rights not as implications of the
people's political sovereignty and political autonomy, but as
reflections of essential individual dignity and worth. Now we
have opened our Constitution to every man, and woman, to the
least and the worst of them. 55 We have opened the Constitution also to new rights and to expanded conceptions of old rights.
We protect personal freedom from slavery and undue incarceration. We safeguard not only political freedom, but also, in principle, social, sexual, and other personal freedoms, privacy, autonomy, and even occasional idiosyncrasy.5 Not only is there
no establishment of religion, but there is a wall of separation;
not only do we guarantee the free exercise of religion, but one
57
shall not suffer disadvantages and burdens for exercising it.
We protect not only political speech, and religious speech, but
economic picketing and commercial advertising; not only the
expression of ideas but all "self-expression," even if offensive,
even to near-obscenity. 58 Our talk is also protected when it is
55. Many rights are also accorded to corporations and associations.

Constitutional rights for them cannot be rooted in a concept of original

autonomy and retained rights, or in individual dignity. Their rights can
perhaps be seen as deriving from the rights of the individuals who compose or create them, or as rights legislated for them by "the people."
56. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (parental education of children); cf. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). But cf. Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty. for
the City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), afj'd mem., 96
S. Ct. 1489 (1976) (upholding crime of sodomy). Compare Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (private possession of obscene matter) with
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (public exhibition of
obscene materials).
57. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
1 (1947); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). But see Roemer v. Board of Public Works
of Maryland, 96 S. Ct. 2337 (1976).
58. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizen Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966).
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"symbolic;" 59 even our money may talk for us almost without
limit, as the Supreme Court told us in invalidating limitations
on campaign contributions.6
Not only is there freedom of the
press to guard and warn us against abuse of government, but
the press has freedom to feed the reader's "right to know"to know what is worthless or perhaps merely titillating even at
the cost of another's public reputation or privacy. 61 The right
to speak and publish includes a right of access to a public
forum; 62 it includes also a right not to speak and not to publish,
or to speak and publish anonymously. 3 Out of these rights we
have made also a right to associate, or not associate, or associate
anonymously. 64 The fourth amendment affords freedom not
only from traditional search and seizure, but also from "bugging"
and wiretapping; 65 security against intrusion not only by police
but also by health and fire inspectors and social workers, 6 6 not
67
only in the home but also in the office and the automobile.
It implies also a right not to have the fruits of illegal search
or seizure used in evidence against the victim. 8 Not only do
gentlemen have rights to be protected against tyrannous harassment by abuse of criminal process, but the worst criminal can
put the government to its case. He is entitled not only to be
59. Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
60. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
61. Cox Broadcasting, Inc. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Compare New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)
with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) and Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 96 S.Ct. 958 (1976).
62. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Compare Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) with Columbia Broadcasting
Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
63. Miami Herald Publish. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974);
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). See also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
64. Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); DeGregory v. New
Hampshire Atty. Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legis.
Invest. Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
65. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
66. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
But cf.
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
67. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920);
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
68. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
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represented by counsel, but to free counsel if he cannot afford
his own. 69
We have abandoned old laws lending themselves to official
abuse-the vague statute, the overbroad, "chilling" law. Laws
against vagrancy, for example, are now void for vagueness, as
giving too little warning to the citizen and too much leeway to
the official."0 We may be reading penological assumptions into
the Constitution; some courts have questioned capital punish71
In conment by demanding proof of its deterrent influence.
tinuing to respect property we have included more subtle, more
sophisticated forms of taking of property as requiring just
72
compensation.
Our principal change has been that we have not only
guaranteed freedom from slavery, but we have written equality
into the Constitution, and sometimes have put it above all the
rest. We require equality from both federal and state government,7 3 and demand it not only for whites, not only for males,
74
We
not only for citizens, not only for the legitimate-born.
opporequal
and
laws
the
of
protection
equal
only
require not
tunity, but also some equalization, some removal of the handicaps of poverty, some affirmative action for the underprivileged. 75

69.

And we have extended it to include political equality

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

70. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). But
see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 773 (1974) (military conviction for "conduct
unbecoming an officer"); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) (disorderly conduct).
71. Compare the various opinions presented in Commonwealth v.
O'Neill, 339 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1975), which was decided under the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Massachusetts Constitution, with the discussion of the purposes of the death penalty in Gregg
v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2930-31 (1976). Justice Goldberg once wanted
the Court to consider whether a state may impose a death penalty for
,a crime which did not take or threaten life. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375
U.S. 889 (1963) (dissent from denial of certiorari). In Gregg, supra at
2932 n.35, the Court declined to address this question.
72. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
73. But see text accompanying note 16 supra.
74. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
75. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (trial transcript); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel on appeal); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (imprisonment in default of fine); Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax); Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (candidate's filing fee); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (fee to file for divorce). But cf. United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (fee to file for bankruptcy).

1976]

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

1135

("one man, one vote") .76
In the "Open Constitution" the courts have found for all of
us rights where none had been known to exist, e.g., a right to
travel at home or abroad. 77 Abandoning assumptions and penetrating stereotypes, the courts have also found rights for those
who had none: the child, apart from, and even against, his
parent;7 8 the pupil, even against his teachers; 79 the soldier, even
against his military superiors;8 0 the prisoner and the civilly
committed, even against their warders. 8 1 And on the horizon
may be rights our ancestors did not dream of-a right to be born
and a right to die; rights for the dead and the unborn; rights
environto security, peace, a healthy environment; rights for 8the
2
ment, for the animal, even the vegetable and mineral.
We have changed also our conception of rights. It is likely
that our ancestors construed their retained rights more narrowly,
but absolutely. As Justice Black was to say later, when the first
amendment said "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press," it meant that Congress shall
make no such law.8 3 It is also likely, however, that they had
a narrower view of the contours of the freedom of speech or
of the press, and a narrow view of what amounted to abridgement. We, having expanded the freedoms of speech and press,
have broadened as well the permissible forms of governmental
76. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964); cf. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S.
621 (1969). But see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); cf. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
77. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958).
78. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct.
2831 (1976). A wife has rights apart from-even against-her husband,
for example, the right to have an abortion. Id.

79. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School

Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
80. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). But cf. Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
81. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). But
see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551 (1976).
82. Mr. Justice Douglas urged that environmental issues might be
litigated "in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled,"
and that "those people who have a meaningful relation" with it should
be recognized as its "legitimate spokesmen." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 741, 743, 745 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
83. E.g., Koenigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61
(1961) (dissenting opinion); H. BLAcK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968);
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960).
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intrusion upon them. Indeed, we treat rights as only presumptive, not absolute, and the courts, in whose care we have
entrusted our rights, balance the private right and the public
good in scales of their own fabrication. Some rights, however,
weigh more than others, are preferred, or fundamental. Their
invasion is suspect and will bow only to a "compelling" public
interest after strict judicial scrutiny.8 4
I have been speaking of constitutional rights. But legislatures have added rights, some of which are so deeply imbedded
as to have constitutional sturdiness. For example, the civil rights
acts of Congress and similar laws of various states now give protections not only against state action (to which the Constitution
spoke) but also against private discriminations and deprivations.8 5 What might surprise the ghosts of our ancestors most
is that we have, by legislation, discarded a priori notions of the
limited purposes of government 86 and moved from fear of
84. Compare United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938) with Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 638 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963). The Court also balances and decides between competing
rights. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976). See also the cases
cited in notes 61 & 78 supra.
85. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
That constitutional limitations generally apply only to "state action"
is commonly seen as deriving from the words that preface the fourteenth
ainendment's prohibitions: "No State shall ....

" See also Civil Rights

Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). But the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights,
which are not in terms addressed to the federal government, also limit
only governmental, not private action.
(The first amendment is
addressed only to Congress but has been held to apply to all who exercise federal authority. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRs AND THE
CONSTITUTION 486-87 n. 7 (1972)).
That constitutional limitations apply
only to government long antedates the fourteenth amendment and
is inherent in the conception of the Constitution as the people's mandate
to their government. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra. In
some contexts, the state action requirement serves also to preserve
rights of the individual, even, for example, a right to make distinctions
which government might not be permitted to make because they would
establish religion, deny equal protection, or deprive of liberty or property. Cf. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion,
110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962).
86. A priori limitations on the purposes of government were given
constitutional sanction much later, in "the Lochner era," when the Supreme Court held that certain social and economic regulations deprived
those affected of their "liberty" without due process of law. Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). That line of constitutional interpretation ended in 1937. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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government to dependence on it (though not without some abiding fear of it); from political and civil rights against governmental abridgement, to economic and social claims upon government.
We are a welfare state. The student of the Constitution will
insist, of course, that there is no constitutional right to social
security, to health or other welfare payments, or to free education.8 7 Indeed, one might recall that we became a welfare state
over constitutional resistance, rooted in states' rights and natural
unalienable rights to freedom of contract. 88 But, like our ancestors, we too borrowed from abroad, even from socialism. The
welfare society is now deeply rooted, as though in the Constitution. With Jefferson's ideals of a watchdog government, leaving
us alone ("laissez-faire"!), compare FDR's famous equation of the
freedom from want with political freedoms. The end of World
War II saw bills in Congress guaranteeing the "socialist" right
to work; and full employment proposals are again heard in the
land today.
V.
I have stressed the continuity and the change. It would be
interesting to explore also why the continuity, why the change,
but the reasons are complex if not mysterious-surely a task less
for one lawyer than a diverse army of historians, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, economists, demographers and
others. Doubtless the explanation has something-perhaps everything-to do with growth, expansion, industrialization, immigration, urbanization, diversification; with our having grown
from three million to over 200 million, from a fringe on the
eastern seaboard to the end of the continent and beyond; from
an agrarian-artisan to an urban-industrial society, a post-industrial society with a mixed economy; from a population largely
homogeneous to one that is mixed, some of it homogenized, some
remaining "chunky"; with our "manifest destiny" to become a
world power. With these have come changes in the total context
Cf. Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1415-16,
1429-32 (1974).
87. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Lavine v. Milne,
96 S. Ct. 1010, 1015 n. 9 (1976); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
88. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525
(1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). See also notes 86 supra & 97
infra.
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of our constitutional system; in values and ideology; in the
balance of our federalism and the density of our bureaucracy;
in the international order of which we are part; in our notions
of public policy and in our theories of representative government
-patrician, pluralist, populist, participatory.
If I cannot add light on why the continuity and why the
change, I would say a word about how-the legal, constitutional
how. We have not, I stress, abandoned or replaced the original
Constitution; it remains the same, the oldest, the only old constitution intact. Nor, except in the aftermath of the Civil War,
have we achieved revolutionary change by revolutionary constitutional amendments. Ours is, with the exception noted, an
essentially unamended constitution. In all we have had 26
amendments in 200 years. The first ten may be discounted since
they were part of the original package, the price of ratification
of the Constitution, and they articulated what was already part
of our constitutionalism in the state constitutions. Of the other
16 amendments, two (18 and 21) largely cancelled each other.
The rest did not make major modifications in either our system
or our principles of government, or in the scope or content of
our individual rights. (I include even the 19th, for women
should have had-I think would have had-the vote by state law
or under compulsion of the 14th Amendment. I include, too, the
25th, although it has given us, temporarily, a President and a Vice
President elected by Congress, the scheme which our Fathers
long considered, then explicitly rejectedso)
My thesis of the unamended constitution, I have said, has
one major exception in the Civil War amendments, notably the
fourteenth, giving us, some might say, our "second Constitution."
To me the fourteenth amendment is still something of a mystery,
for while the defeated states had it imposed on them, the victorious states imposed that radical amendment on themselves. Had
they learned the dangers of centrifugalism and come to see the
need for stronger central institutions? Was the war for them
a great nationalizing experience, somewhat as in our century
World War II brought the United Nations system, NATO, the
European Community and other internationalizing institutions?
Or were the northern states unaware of the implications of the
new amendment, unable to foresee what federal courts would
find in it?
89.

FARRAND,

supra note 6, at 507.
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So much of the constitutional change I have detailed built
on that amendment. To free the slaves and protect them in freedom we converted, at least as regards individual rights, from a
federalism to a nation and paved the way for eventual economic
and social integration. The fourteenth amendment effectively
nationalized the relations of government to citizen, providing a
new basis for federal legislation directly regulating individuals,
and for scrutiny of state action by the federal judiciary. It established the principle of equality, not separate; equality between
genders, and between citizen and alien, and some between rich
and poor; political equality-one man, one vote.9 0 It has given
us indefeasible citizenship and thereby freedom from expatriation, expulsion, exile. 91 It provided the basis for protecting "natural rights" as "liberty," entitled to substantive due process of
law.9 2 It effectively made the United States Bill of Rights applicable to the states and enforceable by federal courtsf 3 By ways
of reading and paths of reasoning obvious only to infallible
judges, it has helped make some of its limitations, notably the
equal protection of the laws, applicable to the federal govern94
ment as well.
There is one other amendment I deem to be of major importance, though it effected no systemic or structural change and
was made necessary only by a 5-4 decision of the Supreme
Court.95 The sixteenth amendment made the spending power
a principal vehicle of our conversion to a welfare state. With
the graduated income tax to pay for our welfare system, and
"equal protection" to keep it non-discriminatory, we have effectively committed our bourgeois, capitalist United States to the
goal that socialism has abandoned: "From each according to his
ability, to each according to his need." 96
90. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
91. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). But cf. Rogers v. Bellei,
401 U.S. 815 (1971).
92. While the same clause had long been in the fifth amendment,
the impetus for developing substantive due process came from opposition
to what states were doing and almost all the leading cases have involved
action of the states. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905);
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); cases cited in notes 56, 86,
& 88 supra. But cf. note 12 supra and accompanying text.
93. The principal provisions of the Bill of Rights have been held
to be incorporated in the fourteenth amendment and therefore applicable
to the states. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); HENKiN, supra note 85, at 501-02 &n.77.
94. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
95. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
96. The 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union declares rather the
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If, the fourteenth amendment apart, our Constitution has
remained essentially unamended, one must find the ways of
change in the Constitution itself, and in its reinterpretation in
response to life and experience. As a prime example, one need
only consider the tortuous history of the commerce power: how
not only the same words, but the same ancestral conception, came
to mean something quite different when applied to a continent
with a national economy and a people that could not be contained
within boundaries of single states. Reinterpretation was gradual,
incremental, responding to a conservative national (human?)
temperament, with an infrequent leap at time of crisis-for
example, during civil war or deep depression. Why that process
succeeded without destroying the Constitution-indeed not only
left it essentially intact but enhanced its authority-is a wellknown mystery. We tend to attribute it to constitutional calibration by the United States Supreme Court, acting in the tradition
of common-law judges, with success that can only be called wonderful and is the envy of other countries (some of whom have
attempted to transplant it, with uncertain, uneven success).
The judicial role and its development, however, ought not be
misperceived. Marshall, as everyone knows, planted the principle that the Constitution was law, a higher law, to be applied
by the courts. But the courts' role in maintaining the constitutional blueprint-the demands of federalism and separation-has
always been and has remained responsive and secondary; the
initiatives to make adjustments in federalism and separation
have, of course, come principally from the political institutions.0 7 The Supreme Court, I remind you, built its authority
by supporting powerful political forces. With small exceptions,
Marshall and his successors staked the Court's future (and ours)
on the nation as against the states. But the Court did not
socialist principle now to be "from each according to his ability, to each
according to his work."

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST

ch. I, art. 12 (1936).
97. In fact, the Court created (or found) obstacles to its involvement-the requirements of case or controversy and standing; the nonjusticiability of "political questions." To this day the states cannot sue
the United States to challenge federal transgressions of federalism. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); cf. Massachusetts v. Laird, 400
U.S. 886 (1970). And the President cannot sue Congress, nor Congress
the President, to adjudicate issues of separation. The New Deal Court
largely opted out of the political confrontations of federalism, retaining
only the authority to monitor state violations, and even those subject to
congressional modification. But cf. National League of Cities v. Usery,
96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
REPUBLICS
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nationalize us; it permitted, and legitimized, nationalizing political forces in Congress and the Presidency. Both Congress and
the President were happy to have the Court's support, and helped
reinforce its authority. The Court did not "take on" both President and Congress when they banded together in support of
national authority until after the Civil War, after its authority
was established; even then it has sometimes suffered serious,
"self-inflicted wounds," as during the early New Deal.
Similarly, the Court has only infrequently become involved
in issues of allocation and separation of power between Congress
and President. Not many such questions have come to court, and
few of those that did have reflected political struggles for power
between Congress and President. In most instances, private
parties set up issues of separation that did not worry the political branches themselves, as, clearly, in issues of undue delegation
by Congress to the President, 98 or, recently, in the federal election campaign case; in some of these, Congress and the President
probably welcomed judicial arbitration. 9
It is in support of individual rights that the courts have come
into direct conflict with political power, and that is largely a
recent development. For our first hundred years the Bill of
Rights remained a "splendid bauble;"' 0 0 perhaps it had deterrent influence-although it did not deter the Alien and Sedition
Laws-but it did not come to court. 10 1 Even after the Civil
98. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
99. The Court generally decided for Congress in the "big ones," see,
e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838);
cf. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Valentine v.
United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). See also Fleming v.
Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 110 (1814). The President won in Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52 (1926), vindicating President Andrew Johnson a half century
earlier, but the Court took much of it back in Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349
(1958). Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), upheld the President's appointment power against congressional usurpation, but the President had
apparently not objected. Cf. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236
U.S. 459 (1915), (President won when an issue of separation implicated
"rights" of a private complainant). Compare the Court's vindication of
the President's pardoning power in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333 (1867), and United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
See also United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
100. This is Marshall's phrase in another context, McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
101. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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War the Court was not in the vanguard, widely championing individual rights against political violations; while it advanced the fourth amendment, 10 2 it gave narrow readings to
the first even in this century, 0 3 and to the demands of equality. 0 4 What is more, it notoriously narrowed protections
which had been afforded by the political branches. It invalidated
civil rights acts by finding that they did not meet "state action"
requirements in the fourteenth amendment. 10 5 Its narrow conception of federal power prevented child labor legislation and
progressive taxes. 0 6 Its narrow conception of proper governmental purposes, asserted in the name of individual rights,
slowed down movement towards a welfare society for almost half
07
a century.
The courts became protectors of individual rights largely
against the states, and principally since the second World War,
after judicial power and prestige were established. Now judicial
supremacy is firm and neither Congress nor the President dares
flout the Supreme Court, although its mandate is carried by one
unarmed marshal. Now that it is established, the Court may
0 8
dare more, even in issues of separation and federalism.'
VI.
We celebrate our Declaration (though we are not high on
revolution), and we love our Constitution. Indeed, it is sobering
to consider that we love the Constitution far more than our
102. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

103. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Some believe that it took a
narrow view also of religious freedom in the polygamy cases. Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1879). Cf. Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S.
245 (1934).
104.

Cumming v. County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899); Plessy

v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
130 (1873).

105. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1883). Cf. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906);
James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
106. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
157 U.S. 429 (1895).
107. See notes 86-88 supra and accompanying text.
108. Cf. notes 43 & 48 supra and accompanying text. The Court
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ancestors did. For them it was a close thing. When we ponder
on "We the people," who ordained the Constitution, it is noteworthy that, according to estimates, only five percent of the total
population voted for delegates to the ratification conventions,
and in half the states almost half of the delegates voted against it.
Only in New York were all (i.e., all males) allowed to vote, and
the result at the New York convention was close. (In New York
City the majority favoring ratification talked of seceding from
the state). It was close in other states, and the process was not
always edifying: we are told that in Philadelphia dissenters were
dragged in against their will to provide a quorum; in Massachusetts procedures were manipulated and in the end ratification squeezed through. Until late, many around the
country thought it would be better to break up into two or three
confederations.'0 .
For our ancestors the Constitution was an experiment and
a gamble. The framers did not even call the new union "perpetual" (as the Articles were labeled), only "a more perfect
Union." Doubtless many assumed it could be abandoned, or
made still more perfect, a few years later. There was a move
for a new convention even before the Constitution was ratified.
The possibility of future constitutional conventions was contemplated by article V of the Constitution. The issue was far from
certain when Marshall, hopefully and as a guide to its interpretation, said that the Constitution was "intended to endure for
ages to come.""u 0 Holmes's peroration later, after union was
secure, was more sober:
[T]hey have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or
might also reduce the obstacles of standing, stretch the concept of case or
controversy, or push back the frontiers of "political question," see note 97
supra. Compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
The Court has shown no disposition, however, to intrude in war. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973), aff'g mem. Atlee v. Laird, 347 F.
Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Some lower courts, however, have done so.
Cf. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'g 361 F.
Supp. 553, cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d
1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). See generally Henkin,
Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
109. See generally R. SCHUYLER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES ch. IV (1923).

110.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a
much sweat and blood
century and has cost their successors
to prove that they created a nation. 111

One lesson they left us we have kept, at least for half of
our 200 years. Said Jefferson in Paris, watching the approaching
French Revolution:
The example of changing a constitution by assembling the
wise men of the state, instead of assembling armies, will be
to the world as the former examples we have
worth as much
12
given them.

Were the hopes of our Fathers, or the fears of the many who
opposed ratification, realized? Perhaps some of both. The
Fathers hoped to create a nation, and they built better than they
knew. They sought "to establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general
welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty for them and their
posterity." We, their posterity, seem to think they have done
well.
We ought not, however, forget and depreciate the opponents
of the Constitution. (Even Jefferson, you will recall, was not
an enthusiastic supporter.) Some opposed it as insufficiently
democratic, as we have since agreed. Some feared for states'
rights, which most of us now discredit, but the states were then
closer to the people and more sensitive to popular needs. Some
feared too much government, a fear many share today, even some
of us who are compelled to conclude that the world has changed
to require it. The opponents insisted on the Bill of Rights, teaching us that liberty requires protective institutions as well as
individual vigilance. They, too, left us an important lesson:
there were no "irreconcilables."
I have emphasized the constitutional changes brought about
by 200 years. Let me, in Bicentennial tribute, summarize what
our Constitutional Fathers achieved.
1. They transmitted to us the elements of constitutionalism
derived from the Declaration and the early state constitutionsa written constitution, popular sovereignty, limited government,
republicanism, individual rights. They built the framework
which in time established American constitutionalism and democracy as our national birthright and hallmark, and gave it to the
world.
111.

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).

112.

SCHUYLER, supra note 109, at 122.
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2. Above all-above the Declaration and the earlier constitutional efforts of the states-the Fathers made us a nation. The
principal purposes for which they came to Philadelphia are
realized today: a national government; a central power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce and to tax and to spend;
a national power over foreign affairs; a central executive and
a national judiciary.
3. The institutions they created have remained essentially
the same. Separation (if not federalism) keeps government
inefficient, but, after Watergate, who can say with confidence
that it has ceased to provide protection against tyranny? Today
we see recurrent congressional efforts to return to the original
conception, as in regard to budget management and the control
of foreign affairs, 113 and we hope that these will achieve the
creative tensions we think the Fathers intended, not merely
paralyzing confrontation. Even federalism, although radically
modified, is still politically alive; indeed there are signs that it
is regaining some vigor, even for states' rights, even vis-a-vis
1 14
important federal regulation.
4. Some ancestral ideas seem to be coming back into their
own, notably "retained rights." Jefferson thought that certain
matters are not the law's business: "[T] he legitimate powers of
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to
others." 1 5 Might that be where the new right of privacy is
taking us, to outlaw "victimless crimes," morals legislation, other
forms of paternalism?" 0
Withal, then, there has been amazing continuity as well as
change. We need not apologize to our Fathers for the change:
their political theory, surely, recognizes our right to govern ourselves. They may even scorn us for too much attention to them:
113. See, e.g., Case Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (Supp. V 1975); The War
Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (Supp. V 1975); Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1301 (Supp. V 1975).
114. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
115. 3 TaE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERsoN 263 (P. Ford ed. 1894).
Jefferson also noted, "Laws provide against injury from others; but not
from ourselves." 2 id. at 100. Compare the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen, CONSTITUTION OF 1791 Title I, art. 3.
116. See note 56 supra and accompanying text; Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 COLuM. L. REV. 1410, 1431-32 (1974). The judgment upholding a conviction for consensual homosexuality, Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty. for the City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975), aff'd mem., 96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976), may prove these expectations
unwarranted, but the Court's unwillingness to justify that result by opinion leaves the future open.
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Jefferson suggested that a constitution expires naturally after
19 years. 117 Some of them surely would applaud us. They
felt they had to go slowly, but would have expected that we
would move, if not very fast. Some of them surely would be
happy that the Constitution governs the states as well, that we
are a representative democracy as well as-more than-a republic; that popular sovereignty is universal suffrage and participation-voting is a natural right (almost); that we abolished slavery
and established the principle of equality of opportunity; that we
have become a welfare state; that we have expanded our rights
as well as the categories of those entitled to them; even, that we
have developed judicial review and given finality to the courts." 8
Perhaps they would think we have dishonored their intentions
in moving from nation to empire, in having quasi-colonial relations to American Indians, to Puerto Rico, Guam, the Marianas,
the Canal Zone. They may be unhappy, as some of us are, that
we have grown lax about "separation," especially in foreign
affairs; that we have reinstated the need to be rich in order to
hold elective office. Some would be sad that we have yet to
fill fully their promises of equality, liberty, and pursuit of
happiness to all our people.
"The history of American democracy," Ralph Barton Perry
wrote, "is a gradual realization, too slow for some and too rapid
for others, of the implications of the Declaration of Independence." 19 We continue that process every day, too slowly for
some, too rapidly for others. But we continue it. Since 1776
ancient dynasties and empires and systems of government have
gone, and many new ones have come and gone. Even France,
our sister in revolution, has had many regimes and several constitutions. The constitution of Great Britain, our spiritual ancestor, is radically changed. But the United States constitutional
system has survived, changed but not too changed.
I do not begin to know how to answer the question I started
with: how have we avoided the fate of other constitutional
systems-recurrent revolutions, strong man or military junta,
successive constitutions, emergency repressions and government
by decree? Was it the wisdom of our Fathers? The genius of
117. 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 115, at 121.
118. Some may be content even that we have effectively abolished
the constitutional right to bear arms and the reliance on state armies
that contributed to civil war. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
119.

R. PERmY,

PURITANISM AND DEMOCRACY

133 (1944).
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the people we were, became, and are? Or great, good luck?
Was it our devotion to ancestral principles, or our conservative
temperament? The ingenuity of the system bequeathed us by
the Fathers, and its amenability to political and judicial calibration? Was it important that they excluded suspension of the
Constitution or of any rights, that they precluded standing armies and insisted on civilian supremacy? That they taught us to
elect our military leaders and domesticate them?
What will speakers say at the next centennial? Somehow we
do not doubt that there will be another, and others after that,
and that they will find our Constitution and institutions not very
different. The Fathers have done well by us. Much will depend
on us and our posterity, on our wisdom, our genius, our luck.

